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PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING 
An Overview of Parallel 
Distributed Processing 
Jonathan P. Heyl 
East Carolina University 
Abstract 
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), or 
Connectionism, is a frontier cognitive 
theory that is currently garnering 
considerable attention from a variety of 
fields. Briefly summarized herein are the 
theoretical foundations of the theory, the 
key elements observed in creating 
simulation computer programs, examples 
of its applications, and some comparisons 
with other models of cognition. A 
majority of the information is culled from 
Rumelhart and McClelland's (1986) two-
volume introduction to the theory, while 
some concerns from the field and the 
theorists' accompanying responses are 
taken from a 1990 article by Hanson and 
Burr. 
The theory of Parallel Distributed 
Processing (PDP), or "Connectionism," is 
currently enjoying some degree of 
attention, in part due to its fairly radical 
departure from the mainstream ideas 
about cognition that have dominated the 
field for the past several decades. The 
reactions to it range from unconditional 
acceptance to denial, but the attitude of 
the majority seems to reflect a "curious 
and interested but not entirely convinced" 
viewpoint. The fact that such an 
apparently large number of people in the 
field are displaying an interest tends to 
lend the theory a degree of legitimacy, or 
at least worthiness of further exploration 
and study, and is the view primarily 
reflected in this paper. 
The majority of the information 
used to describe the theory in this paper is 
culled from Rumelhart and McClelland's 
two-volume explanation of PDP published 
in 1986, with the intent being to 
summarize and possibly simplify the 
major structural points. The latter part of 
this paper reviews some objections and 
concerns about the theory that followed a  
more recent article on PDP by Hanson and 
Burr (1990). 
PDP is a difficult theory to 
summarize for several reasons. First, it is 
extremely complex mathematically, with 
numerous symbolic formulas to represent 
various functions. Secondly, its domain is 
broad, operating not only under the 
conventions of the field of psychology 
(diverse in itself), but expanding to 
encompass the fields of computer science, 
philosophy, and artificial intelligence. 
Thirdly, the theory is undergoing rapid 
refinement under a surge of 
experimentation and its subsequent new 
data, leaving some components of its 
original form approaching obsolescence. 
"Parallel" processing denotes the 
simultaneous activity occurring in the 
brain at any one time, as opposed to 
processing of a serial nature. The idea is 
that such a vast amount of information is 
being processed so quickly in the 
performance of even the simplest tasks 
that time constraints rule out the 
possibility of exclusively serial operation. 
This is not necessarily meant to deny the 
existence of any serial processes, for it 
seems obvious that there are some (e.g., 
problem solving). Yet each step of these 
higher-order serial processes is made 
possible by, and is the result of, large-
scale parallel processing. 
Supporting the idea of parallel 
processing is the speed of the neuron, 
which is relatively slow (compared to a 
purely electronic device, and more 
specifically, a computer). Rumelhart and 
McClelland (1986) point out that "neurons 
operate in the time scale of milliseconds 
whereas computer components operate in 
the time scale of nanoseconds—a factor of 
106 faster." Thus, observed human 
operations taking approximately one 
second to compute would be limited to 
performing only about one hundred 
sequential steps—an improbably low 
number given the complexity of functions 
like perception, speech analysis, etc. Also 
implying parallelism is the vast number of 
neurons we possess, estimated to be 
between 1010 and 1011, each being an 
"active processing unit" and capable of 
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receiving input from many other neurons 
by means of simple excitatory or 
inhibitory impulses. These 
interconnections between neurons are 
usually short, as well as symmetrical, 
implying at least the possibility of back 
propagation (feed-backward as well as 
feed-forward impulses) and interactive 
activation (Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). 
The word "distributed" in the 
theory's title refers to the authors' 
contention that representations are not 
complete entities stored as a whole at 
some location in the brain. Rather, 
representations are distributed across 
some number of units (neurons) and are 
held in the "connective weights," or 
strengths, between them. When certain 
neurons are activated, their activation is 
fed through these weights to produce a 
pattern of activation representative of the 
"stored" item. When the memory is not 
activated, it resides only in connection 
strengths between neurons. 
Part of the evidence supporting 
distributed storage is based on 
observations of how performance declines 
following brain damage. In many ways it 
reflects Lashley's (1929) Mass Action 
findings, wherein removal of brain tissue 
leads to "graceful degradation" of 
performance, rather than the complete loss 
of some motor function or the loss of an 
entire "concept." This is not intended to 
mean that there are no localized areas 
within the brain, but it does maintain that 
knowledge within these localized areas is 
distributed. Just as there are both serial 
and parallel aspects to processing, there 
exist both local and distributed aspects of 
storage. PDP maintains simply that the 
operations of the brain are primarily 
parallel and distributed in nature. 
Much of what makes PDP 
appealing is its theoretical similarity to 
"neural hardware." One goal of PDP is to 
construct models that not only function 
with optimal efficiency and accuracy, but 
that also retain human physiological 
plausibility. It has prompted a rethinking 
of artificial intelligence and its methods, 
and its insights have redirected some ideas 
about human cognition that were based on  
computer models. One of these ideas 
regards the omission of any "central 
executive" or "program chip" to form and 
retrieve memories. To PDP, everything 
from learning to recall to concept 
formation is related to the basic, elemental 
units and their interactions. While this is 
sometimes criticized for being below the 
level at which a cognitive theory should 
operate, it is arguably a highly appropriate 
and logical place to start. Studying and 
understanding the lowest elements may 
lead to future discovery of "higher" 
functions, which would then enjoy the 
benefit of a strong foundation. 
Analogously, Rumelhart and McClelland 
(1986) concede that it would be difficult 
to understand a diamond just by studying 
a single carbon atom. However, it would 
be rather foolish to ignore what we know 
of this carbon atom and how it aligns with 
others when studying the diamond as a 
whole. Concluding simply that a diamond 
is "hard" is of questionable significance in 
understanding it. 
With these ideas in mind, let us 
proceed to a description of the model's 
architecture. While various computer-
simulated models differ, there are certain 
aspects of any PDP model that remain 
basically constant, outlined by Rumelhart 
and McClelland (1986) in their 
explanation of a model's general 
framework. 
The basic element is, of course, the 
processing unit itself, equivalent 
theoretically to a highly-simplified model 
of a neuron. Each individual unit's role in 
the system is very limited; it is a small 
component of a larger system, and is 
basically meaningless in and of itself. The 
pattern resulting from the activity between 
many units is what defines a meaningful 
entity. A unit's only function is to receive 
input, compute an output value from it, 
and send that output value to other units. 
Some-systems use only two types 
of units, but many use three. Input units 
receive external input, either from the 
"world" or from other units outside the 
observed system. Output units direct 
signals from the system outside, either to 
other systems or directly to motoric 
activity. The third type of units, called 
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hidden units, neither influence nor are 
influenced by forces outside the system, 
but reside between the input and output 
units and function as modifiers of activity 
between the two. The earliest 
"connectionist-type" models, such as the 
ancestral "perceptron" of Rosenblatt 
(1958), relied only on the input and output 
units and were therefore somewhat limited 
in their capabilities. The employment of 
hidden units is what has allowed the more 
recent systems to function at a much 
higher level of performance. 
The state of activation of a system 
reflects what a certain system is 
representing at a certain time, based on the 
activation value of its units (recall that a 
representation is defined by a pattern of 
activation across multiple units). This 
may be represented in vector notation by a 
vector a, with each value in that vector 
specifying the activation of one unit. For 
example, the activation of a four-unit 
vector a at time t, written as a(t), might be 
[1,0,-1,0] . 	 This distinct pattern of 
activation denotes the current 
representation. 	 It could represent 
anything—a dog, a cat, a baseball, etc.; 
each unit is activated to a certain value 
based on the stimulus input of the object, 
and each object in this way motivates a 
different "pattern of activation vector" for 
representing it. 
Activation values may vary 
according to the specific model being 
considered. Some models specify discrete 
levels (which are usually binary), with "1" 
meaning the unit is activated and "0" 
meaning that it is not. A discrete model 
could also range from -1 to 1, as in the 
example above. Other models may 
specify the use of continuous activation 
values which might yield, for example, a 
vector such as [ .6, .4, 0, -.8]. 
In addition to receiving inputs, 
units also pass output on to other units. 
How they affect neighboring units is a 
result of their own current level of 
activation being mapped through an 
output function (f) to produce an output 
signal oi(t) (the output of unit i at time t). 
Basically, a unit receives input, converts it 
to an output signal, and passes it along to 
connected units that receive it as input.  
Usually a threshold value is involved; that 
is, unless a unit is activated to a certain 
value, it will have no effect at all on 
neighboring units. This means that if a 
unit is activated in such a way as to 
compute a .6 output value, but its 
threshold is 1, the units connected to it 
receive no input from it at all. 
The pattern of connectivity 
between the units represents the 
knowledge contained in the system. 
Simply, everything a system "knows" is 
represented by which units are 
interconnected, the modifiable strengths 
of those connections, and, as a 
consequence, the pattern they will produce 
when activated. In the simplest case, it is 
assumed that the input to a unit is the 
weighted sum of all inputs it receives 
from units that are connected to it. The 
positive or negative value of this sum 
determines whether the input is excitatory 
or inhibitory, and its absolute value 
denotes the strength, or weight, of the 
connection. More complex cases may call 
for different types of inputs to be summed 
before impinging on the designated unit. 
For example, all excitatory inputs may be 
run through one connectivity matrix to 
produce a value, while all inhibitory 
inputs are run through a separate 
connectivity matrix, with their final values 
then summed upon reaching the 
designated recipient unit. 
The rule of propagation takes the 
"output values of the units and combines it 
with the connectivity matrices to produce 
a net input for each type of input into the 
unit" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). 
This refers to the issue stated above, 
regarding the modification of input signals 
in a matrix before impinging on a unit. 
The activation rule, expressed as 
the function F, combines all the net inputs 
acting on a unit with that unit's current 
activation level in order to produce a new 
--level of activation for that unit. That is, 
the level to which a unit is activated is a 
function of the activation level it currently 
maintains and the net input of all units 
impinging on it. 
To accommodate learning, the 
patterns of connectivity must be 
modifiable as a result of experience. 
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Adjustment to the interconnective weights 
is necessary, since it is these weights that 
"store" all knowledge. The most easily 
understood approach to accomplishing 
this utilizes an extended and expanded 
version of the Hebbian learning rule, 
which basically states that any time any 
two connected units are highly activated, 
the connective weight between them 
should be strengthened. The most 
commonly-used extension of this is the 
Widrow-Hoff, or delta rule, so named 
because "the amount of learning is 
proportional to the difference (or delta) 
between the actual activation achieved 
and the target activation provided by a 
teacher" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). In other words, how much is 
learned (how much the weight is 
modified) is proportional to the distance 
between where it is and where it needs to 
be. The further "off-target" it is, the more 
it will learn. (Incidentally, the "teacher" 
function could be considered somewhat 
controversial, in that it is external in 
nature; however, many examples of 
human learning do have an external 
teacher that guides the formation of 
correct associations. This teacher, though, 
does not change connective weights; that 
is done internally in the human mind.) 
Symbolically, the delta rule is written 
AWij = n (ti(t) - ai(t)) oj(t) and states that 
the weight connection between unit i and 
unit j changes as a function of the 
proportional rate of learning, the teaching 
input on unit i minus that unit's current 
activation, and the output value of unit j. 
Lastly, any PDP model must have 
a specified environment that it is to 
operate in. What this means is that "there 
is some probability that any of the 
possible set of input patterns is impinging 
on the input units" (Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986). This is significant 
when models are restricted as to what 
types of vectors they can accept as input, - 
or what kind of stimuli they are equipped 
to process. 
While the above aspects are in 
simplified form and not precisely 
applicable to all the various models that 
have been constructed (some use more 
complex, non-Hebbian learning rules, for  
example), they do provide an overview of 
the basic workings of a PDP system. 
Builders of PDP models employ 
the general framework just covered, but 
also operate under further constraints to 
maintain neural plausibility in their 
models. One of these is the "100-step 
program" constraint (Feldman, 1985), 
regarding the aforementioned limit on the 
number of sequential steps a brain is 
capable of processing in a second. The 
constructed models perform comparably, 
time-wise, with humans; that is, if the 
model can produce an output in less than a 
second, it must use parallelism in order 
not to violate the "100 sequential steps per 
second" limit that is imposed on the 
human mind by the slowness of neuronal 
activity. The nanosecond processing 
capability of the computers is not allowed, 
for this would result in an inaccurate 
simulation of human performance. 
A second point is brought up by 
PDP proponents to distance their models 
from the usual (or older) computer 
analogies to thinking. As mentioned 
earlier, all models consider knowledge to 
be stored in the connection strengths, 
rather than as a "state." While a pattern 
can be activated to a state temporarily, 
that state is not the knowledge. That 
knowledge is said to be implicit in the 
system, residing only in the weights. In 
effect, PDP wants to "replace the 
'computer metaphor' as a model of mind 
with the 'brain metaphor' as a model of 
mind" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). 
So what are PDP models capable 
of? Some fairly impressive things, 
actually. Two models are presented in the 
following paragraphs in an attempt to 
illustrate the methods of functioning and 
the capabilities. Probably the simplest 
model to describe and understand is the 
pattern associator, so it will be presented 
first. The second model considered shows 
PDP's applicability to the field of artificial 
intelligence. 
What a pattern associator does, as 
its name implies, is associate two different 
patterns of activation that are related in 
some manner. Rumelhart and McClelland 
(1986) use as an example a system that 
learns to associate the pattern of activation 
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representing the appearance of an object 
with that of its aroma, so that when given 
the visual input (e.g. [+1,-1,-1,+1]), it will 
produce the olfactory pattern (a similar 
vector). 
It accomplishes this through the 
use of a matrix (four rows by four 
columns in this case), with the visual input 
vector placed horizontally across the top 
and the olfactory vector positioned 
vertically along the side. The goal is to 
have the values on the visual vector excite 
the corresponding value on the olfactory 
vector if it is a positive value, and inhibit 
it if it is a negative value. This is done by 
modifying the strengths of the connections 
within the matrix, so that when multiplied 
by the values of the visual vector, each 
row will sum to the desired value on the 
olfactory vector. For example, if the 
visual vector is specified as [+1,-1,-1,+1[, 
and needs to produce a (-1) value at the 
top position of the olfactory vector 
(corresponding to the top row of the 
matrix), then the connective weight values 
would 
	
be 	 "tuned" 	 to 
[-.25,+.25,+.25,-.25]. Thus, as each value 
of the visual vector is multiplied by the 
connection strength it results in a (-.25) 
value; and when these four values are 
summed across the row they yield the 
appropriate (-1) value on the olfactory 
vector. The remaining three rows in the 
matrix are set up in the same way, to yield 
appropriate values in the remaining 
positions of the vertical olfactory vector. 
While this model may not seem simple at 
first glance, its simplicity becomes more 
evident after a short time of study and 
consideration (and seems even more so in 
light of other PDP models). 
This simple model illustrates some 
interesting attributes of distributed 
representations. First, it learns through 
simple repetition; that is, learning is 
accomplished simply by repeated 
simultaneous presentations - of the two 
patterns. Furthermore, the model can 
"teach itself' the proper set of connection 
weights (within the matrix), just as a result 
of this experience. It employs the basic 
Hebbian rule, extended to cover positive 
and negative activation values: the 
strength of the connection between the  
visual and olfactory vectors is adjusted "in 
proportion to the product of their 
simultaneous activation . . . if the product 
is positive, the change makes the 
connection more excitatory, and if the 
product is negative, the change makes the 
connection more inhibitory" (Rumelhart 
& McClelland, 1986). The strengths of 
the connections are formed gradually, in 
Hebbian fashion, and the information 
needed to determine their values is 
available locally from the activation of 
neighboring units. No "central executive" 
is needed. Essentially, an "empty" or 
"blank" pattern associator could learn to 
associate the two patterns simply through 
exposure to repeated simultaneous 
presentations. 
An interesting point arises with 
regard to this pattern associator, and lends 
it a degree of similarity with human 
functioning. A perfect visual pattern is 
not necessary to produce an accurate 
olfactory pattern (though an imperfect 
visual pattern would result in a weaker-
than-optimal olfactory pattern). For 
example, altering one value on the visual 
vector (e.g., flipping it to zero) would still 
result in the corresponding value on the 
olfactory vector being pushed in the 
proper direction (positive or negative). 
This is known as "graceful degradation," 
and is seen in other PDP models. It 
maintains, basically, that internal access to 
a representation is not lost completely as a 
result of distorted input, a characteristic 
that stands in stark contrast to a 
computer—for without a precise "address" 
from which to obtain desired information, 
a computer will produce nothing at all. 
The matrix formed to associate the 
above two patterns can also be used to 
associate a separate pair of patterns, or 
some number of other patterns. Assume 
that a second pattern associator matrix is 
produced using the visual and olfactory 
-patterns of another object. When this 
matrix is overlaid on the original one and 
the separate connective weights are 
summed at their corresponding positions, 
the result is a matrix that will produce the 
correct olfactory output given either set of 
visual input. Using a simple Hebbian rule 
as stated above, this matrix is limited to 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 
	
21 
Jonathan P. Heyl 
accurately processing only inputs that are 
fairly distinct from one another, but 
matrices incorporating more elaborate 
learning rules are capable of handling 
many similar inputs. This latter type leads 
to the emergence of several attractive 
properties. 
One of these is that a new visual 
pattern that is similar to an old one will 
generate a similar olfactory pattern, 
leading to a useful form of "spontaneous 
generalization." The model is also 
capable of extracting a "central tendency" 
from the repeated presentation of the same 
pattern with various degrees of distortion. 
Furthermore, the model will "recognize" 
and utilize regularities between different 
pairs of patterns, allowing the formation 
of interconnective strengths that produce 
patterns that appear to be the result of rule 
usage, but are really attained only through 
repetition of input patterns. 	 One 
particular model, as an example, was fed 
pairs of words, the first being a root verb 
and the second being its past-tense form 
'(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). After 
multiple pairs were presented, it was 
tested using previously unused (non-
training set) words, and produced child-
like errors that appeared to result from the 
application of rules (e.g., it converted 
"come" to "camed"). No "add -ed" rule 
was ever given to the system, yet its 
connections were formed with the 
tendency to apply that particular pattern. 
More complex models, particularly 
those that utilize hidden units to modify 
the signals between the input and output 
units, are capable of substantially more 
impressive results. 
	 One model 
(Churchland, 1989) is presented here as an 
example, and was designed with the goal 
of differentiating the very similar sonar 
echoes of mines and rocks on the ocean 
floor. This is an extremely difficult task, 
in that the two echoes sound identical to 
the untrained human ear, - and the echoes 
within each type may vary considerably. 
The network was constructed with 
thirteen input units, each one's activation 
level being dependent on a certain sound 
frequency extracted from the echo. A 
layer of seven hidden units, each receiving 
input from all thirteen input units, then  
processed the incoming signals and sent 
modified output signals to the two output 
units. Only two output units were needed, 
for the ideal output values of [1,0] for 
mines and [0,1] for rocks. 
The model learned by being given 
multiple examples of mine and rock 
echoes (vectorized by sound frequency) 
one at a time, and having its output 
evaluated after each. Following each 
presentation, its actual output was 
compared with its target output, and the 
connective weights within the system that 
were deemed most likely to be causing the 
error were adjusted according to 
Rumelhart, Williams, and Hinton's 
algorithmic "generalized delta rule" 
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). After 
several thousand presentations and weight 
modifications, the system was surprisingly 
accurate in its ability to distinguish the 
two types of echoes in its training set 
(approximately 90% correct). It had 
"tuned" its connections to detect whatever 
combination or pattern of features was 
unique to each type of echo. The 
"knowledge" was in its connections 
weights and was obtained through a 
learning algorithm that allowed those 
weights to be acquired. 
What was going on inside the 
model to allow the connection weights 
alone to distinguish a rock echo from a 
mine echo? One must stretch, 
intellectually, and grasp the notion of a 
seven-dimensional "hyper" figure within, 
an abstract space with one dimension 
supplied by each of the hidden units. 
Each echo vector that was fed into the 
system, and consequently to the hidden 
units, fell into one point in this "hidden 
unit activation vector" space. The 
system's objective was to divide this space 
into two subspaces, one to represent rocks 
and one to represent mines. The output 
units' only job was then to determine 
which subspace a given echo fell within. 
Yet this system's capabilities go 
impressively further. Echo vectors that 
occupied the center of each subspace were 
the prototypes and would produce output 
values near the goals of either [1,0] or 
[0,1]. Those vectors that fell near the 
boundary separating the two subspaces 
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would retain the proper relationship 
between the two values, but would be less 
precise--for example, [.6, .4]. This 
illustrates the system's "graded 
responses," and is evidence of its 
sensitivity to similarities across the 
dimensions. The system is impressive in 
and of itself, but becomes more so when 
its characteristics are applied to something 
like human speech perception, where we 
accurately process a highly variant set of 
phonemic input into "subspaces" of 
correct categorization. Interestingly, this 
human capability was simulated to some 
degree in the PDP model of NETtalk 
(Rosenberg & Sejnowski, 1987). 
Moving into the construction of 
memory models, PDP focuses once again 
on the micro-elements, exploring and 
theorizing on the roles of neurons and 
their connections. By the theorists' own 
admission, their memory model does not 
at this point attempt to elucidate the 
detailed processes involved in the retrieval 
and use of memory to guide behavior. 
What they are attempting to do is 
construct a physiologically plausible 
model that conforms to empirical data that 
strongly imply the storage of both general 
and specific information, in the form of 
abstracted prototypes and specific 
exemplars. This is done within the 
general framework of individual units, 
activation values, and weighted 
connections. 
In the memory model, the units are 
structured into larger entities called 
modules, each of which consists of a large 
number of interconnected units. The 
modules themselves are also 
interconnected, and each may receive 
input either from the other modules or 
from external stimuli. 
A mental state is defined as "a 
pattern of activation over the units in 
some subset of the modules" (Rumelhart 
& McClelland, 1986). • Basically, the 
pattern currently activated represents what 
resides in conscious thought at that 
moment. Each memory, or pattern of 
activation, leaves a trace, or slight change 
in the interconnective weights. Being of a 
distributed nature, all memory traces in 
the system leave their influence in a  
common set of weights. The process of 
retrieval is simply the calling-up of a prior 
mental state with the aid of an externally-
supplied cue, which would itself be some 
part or "fragment" of the original state. 
This external cue could possibly come 
either from the "world" or from an internal 
search process, although a specific 
mechanism for the latter has not yet been 
fully developed for incorporation into the 
model. 
The units in the model can take on 
any value between -1 and 1. A zero value 
is considered neutral, and weights will 
tend to decay toward it with time. In an 
attempt to maintain consistency with 
human functioning, this decay is assumed 
to be rapid at first and then gradually 
slowing. This translates roughly into the 
"freshness" of a recent human memory, 
and how it becomes less easily accessible 
with the passage of time. 
Each memory trace that passes 
through the module causes a slight change 
in the complete set of weights. The delta 
rule is utilized for establishing the correct 
direction and magnitude of each weight 
change, and its function is to enhance the 
"storage of connection information." That 
is, given a partial pattern as a retrieval 
cue, the connections between the units are 
weighted in such a way as to reinstate the 
complete pattern by providing appropriate 
excitatory/inhibitory input to the 
connected units. The goal is to have 
internal activation match external 
activation. For example, if a certain unit 
is excited by some input pattern, the 
connections leading to it from other units 
will tend to excite it as well. 
The specific model explained in 
the following paragraphs (Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986) was designed to 
illustrate what occurs in the storage of 
memories, and how memories naturally 
categorize themselves and form a 
prototype for that category. It shows how 
multiple concepts can be held in the same 
set of weights, and the ability of specific 
examples to exist in the weights in 
addition to the prototype. 
The model was constructed using 
twenty-four units—sixteen for 
representing the visual patterns of 
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activation for different "dogs," and the 
remaining eight for representing various 
different names, or types, of dogs. A 
prototype "dog" vector was constructed, 
being just a randomly-chosen string of -1 
and +1 values. This prototype was never 
presented to the model, but fifty random 
distortions of it were, each obtained from 
the random flipping of different values on 
the vector. After each presentation of a 
distortion, the delta rule modified the 
weights appropriately, and these 
increments to the weights were then 
allowed to decay down to about five 
percent of their initial effect before the 
next presentation. 
What results is a set of weights 
that changes slightly with the presentation 
of each new distortion, but after fifty 
presentations of distortions it forms a 
matrix remarkably close to the "prototype 
dog" pattern. Most deviations from the 
prototype are caused by the most recent 
distortions presented to it. This is due to 
the lesser amount of time to decay and the 
fact that no further presentations have 
been presented to "blend" their influence. 
This is consistent with observed 
characteristics in human memory. The 
model will more easily "recognize" the 
prototype than any specific examples 
(distortions), but it cannot apply a name to 
the prototype pattern, since each distortion 
was given with a different name vector 
(corresponding to the different types of 
dogs). If, however, all the examples given 
had been named simply "dog", then the 
model would produce the prototype visual 
pattern in response to the prompt of that 
name (and vice versa--if given the 
prototype visual pattern, it would respond 
with the name pattern for "dog"). 
Yet the model's abilities go beyond 
this. The model was next shown to be 
capable of storing three different concepts 
in the same set of twenty-four units. Two 
of 	 the patterns were - similar 
(nonorthogonal), representing "dog" and 
"cat," while the third pattern was 
orthogonal and represented "bagels." 
When given distortions of the 
three different prototypes (under the same 
procedure as above), and given the 
appropriate category name  
simultaneously, the model assigned each 
pattern to its proper concept. That is, after 
a sufficient number of training trials, the 
model was able to produce the appropriate 
prototype pattern when given a category 
name. As with humans, making the 
distinction between dogs and cats took 
longer than distinguishing those two from 
bagels, but the delta rule ultimately settled 
on a set of weights that reliably produced 
the desired results. 
	 The model 
accomplished this by the fiftieth trial; all 
three concepts and their prototypes were 
held within the same set of weights. 
Furthermore, the model was proven able 
to form these three visual-pattern 
categories without the aid of being given 
names; in this case, the eight-valued name 
vectors presented with the visual patterns 
were all flipped to zero. Still the model 
achieved proper categorization of the 
three different patterns, with no 
mechanism supplied for doing so. 
The model can also store the 
patterns of specific exemplars in addition 
to the prototype, as is obviously necessary 
in human memory. In this situation, the 
model was again given fifty training trials. 
One particular distortion of the prototype 
was given the name "Rover" as an eight-
unit name pattern vector, another was 
given "Fido," and the remaining 
distortions were simply called "dog." 
After training, the model could produce 
the appropriate visual pattern given the 
name of either exemplar (Rover or Fido); 
if given the name "dog," it would produce 
the prototype visual pattern. Its ability to 
do this lies in the weight connections. 
The name pattern for "Rover" is 
connected with the visual pattern in such a 
way as to reinstate the pattern. 
Incidentally, there was only one element 
that differed between the "Rover" visual 
pattern and the prototype pattern. 
Because of this, the unit representing that 
element had an extremely strong 
connection to the pattern representing the 
"Rover" name. 
What we see regarding the 
"Rover" illustration is "content 
addressability," which means that a 
memory is accessible given a partial 
element of its pattern as a prompt. This 
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prompt, or retrieval cue, is not used as an 
aid in "finding" the whole memory in 
permanent storage and bringing up a copy 
of it to working memory; rather, it is a 
part of the memory itself, and its 
activation will complete the activation of 
the entire pattern via interconnections 
between units. 
The basic ideas underlying this 
model can be applied to the explanation of 
other aspects of memory as well. Models 
have been constructed that can accurately 
duplicate the effects of semantic priming 
seen in human behavior (Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986). Semantic priming—
the ability to recall a familiar item more 
easily and quickly if it has been recently 
experienced—has fallen into some 
difficulty lately in its interpretation. 
Traditionally, the priming effect seen in 
word recognition was explained by 
assuming the presence of a "word 
detector" or "logogen" in the mind, with a 
threshold level for activation. Each time 
the word detector was activated, the 
threshold would be lowered 
(temporarily—eventually the activation 
effect decays). But Rumelhart and 
McClelland (1986) note that empirical 
testing (Jacoby, 1983) has shown that 
changes in context (e.g., different voices 
or media employed in the priming and test 
conditions) result in weaker priming 
effects, which would not be predicted if 
dealing with a single word detector. 
Presumably, any manner in which said 
word detector is accessed should serve 
equally well. 
The PDP model used to account 
for this strays little in concept from the 
above theory, but attempts to describe 
priming effects physiologically and to 
account for the problem of changing 
contexts. Imagine a stimulus detector 
spread over a set of weights, such as the 
structure of the "dog" module presented 
above. Each activation of that particular 
stimulus (assume for convenience that the 
stimulus is a word) contributes to a 
composite memory trace, much like all the 
different presentations of "dogs" 
contributed to an averaged prototype; but 
"the characteristics of particular 
experiences tend nevertheless to be  
preserved, at least until they are 
overridden by canceling characteristics of 
other traces" (Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). 
The ability to more easily perceive 
a recently-presented stimulus is a result of 
the composite memory trace being 
recently active, allowing a new 
presentation of the stimulus to settle into a 
stable pattern of activation across the units 
more quickly. The effect of changing 
contexts is explainable by the supposition 
that recent memory traces have not 
decayed as much, leaving a relatively 
strong influence on the pattern across the 
units. If a stimulus is presented in a 
testing condition that is identical to the 
priming situation, these strong traces 
enable a match to be made promptly. If 
the stimulus is presented under different 
testing conditions, the system does not 
have the benefit of an exact match and 
must access the somewhat "distorted" 
averaged pattern that resides in the 
composite memory trace as a whole. 
What this type of structure in a model 
does is continually update a "summary 
representation," with the most recent 
exemplars influencing the pattern slightly 
in their direction. With time, or with 
subsequently presented exemplars, the 
characteristics of the exemplars blend into 
a composite memory trace. The more 
similar each exemplar is to the summary 
representation, the more they will blend, 
and lose their individual characteristics 
relating to the context in which they were 
experienced. Exemplars that vary widely 
from the central tendency will tend to be 
held as memory traces in the context in 
which they were experienced. 
The above point can be used to 
explain the gradual conversion of episodic 
memory traces to semantic memories (if 
one subscribes to a distinction between the 
two). Assume a "proposition" is 
experienced at several different times and 
in several different contexts. If each 
experience is generally consistent with the 
others, a central tendency or summary 
representation will emerge from the 
similarities between them, while their 
unique contexts will gradually "wash out" 
as a consequence of their evident 
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irrelevance. What is left is a summary 
representation of a proposition that is 
considered semantic in nature, but that 
was formed naturally by episodic 
experiences. 
Furthermore, this line of thinking 
can be employed to explain the results of 
the well-known Loftus experiments (e.g., 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974), in which 
subjects' memories were apparently 
"changed" as a result of the wording that 
was used when asking for recall. PDP 
would contend that one memory was not 
"overwritten" by the other, but that the 
wording of the recall question formed 
another memory "trace" that blended with 
the first one. Since, according to PDP, 
memories do not exist as a whole but as a 
set of weights that are modified with each 
new trace, the observed results in the 
Loftus experiments reflect a modified 
composite memory. Could the "original" 
memory be drawn out, as has been 
suggested, through the use of hypnosis or 
other techniques? Probably, if the original 
trace has not decayed sufficiently into the 
blend, and can be reinstated with strong 
enough contextual fragments of its 
original pattern as cues. 
What PDP is attempting to show 
with its memory models is that simple 
units, in conjunction with the delta rule for 
modifying weights between them with 
information that is locally available, can 
account for observed characteristics of 
memory without any type of executive 
overseer. They will automatically and 
naturally draw out a central tendency from 
input without any mechanisms for 
generalization and without any rule 
applied by a "program chip." PDP does 
not assert that rules do not exist in any 
area of cognition, but merely intends to 
show that some processes that appear to 
use rules or a "program" are not 
necessarily doing so. 
How does PDP's conception of 
memory compare with other theories? It 
obviously differs considerably from the 
original stage models based on computers, 
such as Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968). 
While this type of model does not enjoy 
the acceptance today that it did upon its 
introduction nearly three decades ago, its  
abstract framework and its distinction 
between "working" and "permanent" 
memory are still readily referred to and 
utilized in explaining cognitive processes. 
PDP does not subscribe to this 
division of memory, its primary objection 
being to envisioning working memory as a 
"central processor" or an executive, 
capable of searching a "file cabinet" of 
separate and complete memories in 
permanent storage. As stated earlier, PDP 
does not view memories as "whole" 
entities, but simply weights in the 
connections between units. For PDP, the 
"file cabinets" would have to be somehow 
interconnected with drawers that slid into 
and through others. The documents in 
"one drawer" may be the "A's" when 
accessed once, and the "P's" when 
accessed the next time. Moreover, new 
documents added to a drawer would tend 
to blend with the other ones, changing the 
characteristics slightly of all the 
documents previously in that drawer, 
which themselves had already influenced 
each other. Stretching this ill-fated 
analogy further, the file cabinets would 
even be "empty" until a the need for a 
document was prompted, at which point 
some number of them would suddenly 
produce it with no search necessary. PDP, 
despite its contentions otherwise, appears 
to be fairly passive in many areas and 
does not at this point allow an "active 
processor" to guide a memory search. 
Before the more recent (and more 
empirically plausible) models are 
examined a point should be made. The 
authors of PDP in its original form 
maintain that their theory is not 
necessarily to be viewed as an alternative 
to other models. That is, it does not 
proclaim the other models to be 
necessarily incorrect in their assumptions 
of the structures and workings of memory. 
Rather, PDP is interested in providing a 
neuronally-plausible explanation for what 
may be occurring within these models. 
PDP is in essence attempting to dissect 
these abstract, symbolic processes and 
structures and provide a physical basis for 
them. When and if these physical 
processes are sufficiently exposed to the 
satisfaction of a majority, they may lead to 
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altered versions of these existing models 
(or completely new ones), but will not 
necessarily require them. In fact, they 
may end up supporting and strengthening 
these previous theories instead. With this 
in mind, a few other models can now be 
examined, noting what PDP has to say 
about their assertions. 
Craik and Lockhart's (1972) levels 
of processing approach states that the 
more deeply material is processed, the 
more durable its resultant memory trace 
will be and the more easily it will be 
retrieved. "Depth" basically correlates 
with semantic processing, as compared to 
"shallow" processing of a stimulus' 
physical characteristics. It shares the 
assumption with PDP that memory is not 
composed of separate storages. 
Experimental support for the level 
of processing as a determinant of recall 
ability (Craik & Watkins, 1973; Parkin, 
1984), wherein subjects better recalled 
material that they had semantically 
processed, could be explained by the 
contentions of PDP. The point could be 
made that semantic processing—as 
opposed to the judging of the physical 
characteristics of a stimulus word—adds 
more dimensions (employs more units) 
and results in a more richly interconnected 
pattern. In effect, semantically processing 
a stimulus word would usually involve 
relating it to its context or associating it 
with related things. Each would form 
connections from the stimulus to the 
related items, meaning that there would be 
a much broader base from which to draw a 
partial pattern, which would then serve as 
an impetus for reinstating the whole. The 
larger a prompted fragment is, the better 
able it is to excite and inhibit its 
interconnected units and achieve pattern 
completion. Interestingly, this 
explanation can account for the data that 
contradict levels of processing as well. 
One experiment that produced such data 
found subjects recalling the stimulus word 
"dime" equally well when given the 
physical-feature cue "ime" as when given 
the semantic cue "an American coin" 
(Nelson & McEvoy, 1979). Again, it is a 
matter of pattern completion. The subject 
has seen the word "dime" and it has  
registered as a visual pattern of activation 
across interconnected units. When given 
"ime" as a cue, seventy-five percent of its 
word detector units are activated and can 
each send appropriate activation to the 
unit responsible for representing the "d" in 
the first position. Thus the pattern is 
completed easily by virtue of internal 
connections formed during exposure to 
the stimulus. 
The teachable language 
comprehender (TLC) of Collins and 
Quillian, possibly the first well-known 
model to employ a hierarchical structure 
of memory items, suffered from test 
results that were inconsistent with its 
predictions. One of its major problems 
stemmed from subjects' tendencies to 
violate the hierarchy, as in more quickly 
confirming a dog's status as an animal 
than its status as a mammal (Rips, 
Shoben, & Smith, 1973). PDP, of course, 
denies any hierarchy in the structure of 
memory. Its evaluation of this effect 
would center on connection strengths and 
would be explained by more heavily-
weighted connections between "dog-
animal" than between "dog-mammal." 
This is due to the principle outlined in the 
basic Hebbian rule, that connective 
weights are strengthened with more 
associations or simultaneous activations. 
Most people hear "dog" associated with 
"animal" much more frequently than with 
"mammal"; it would be rare to hear 
someone ask if there were any mammals 
in your backyard. Judging from the 
literature, frequency of association was 
generally suspected to be the culprit in 
this, and the Hebb rule provides a 
comfortable degree of support for this 
conclusion. 
Another problem the TLC model 
had regarded "better examples" of 
categories (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). 
For example, subjects might verify a 
peach more quickly than a watermelon as 
a fruit. It is possible to account for this 
finding with the assertions of PDP as well. 
When the word "fruit" is heard, assume it 
triggers the prototype pattern of activation 
for that concept (imagine it as a vector of 
some length with various positive and 
negative activation values). The activated 
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pattern for "peach" closely resembles the 
pattern of this prototype, because its 
features closely resemble the "averaged" 
pattern of all fruits. A watermelon's 
pattern, however, does not as closely 
resemble the averaged prototype, and 
would thus take longer to verify. The 
existence of a prototype was never in 
doubt in explaining the effect of the 
"better example," but PDP provides a 
attractive account of the underlying 
processes involved. 
Collins' next attempt, the 
spreading activation model (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975), dropped the hierarchical 
structure and replaced it with nodes whose 
associative strengths with other nodes 
were reflected in the lengths of the links 
between them. This type of model begins 
to approach the thinking of PDP. PDP 
would use connective weights to signify 
associability rather than semantic distance 
along a link and would further attempt to 
expose the structure within the nodes (as a 
pattern of activation) rather than accepting 
them as abstract "wholes." Spreading 
activation assumed serial processes as 
opposed to PDP's parallel, but the 
remainder of its assumptions (regarding 
the strength of activation, and the more or 
less involuntary activation of closely 
associated nodes) could be adapted and 
modified to fit within the PDP approach 
without too much difficulty. A weakness 
of the spreading activation model lay in 
the "prestored knowledge" supposed to 
exist in the structure which readily 
supplied "no" answers via "is not a" links. 
PDP would never assume a priori 
knowledge, and would thus avoid such a 
weakness (although negative answers pose 
an equally formidable challenge for PDP 
models). 
Anderson's Adaptive Control of 
Thought (ACT) theory (1976) is possibly 
the most sophisticated in the realm of 
semantic networks. It also, with a few 
exceptions, approaches the principles 
embodied in PDP. The storage of 
propositions is likely an apt way of 
representing knowledge, though Anderson 
fails to speculate on the physiological 
aspects of how these propositions are 
constructed. The propositions could be  
likened to memory modules in a PDP 
system, and their interconnective links 
representing the strengths of the 
associations between them could easily be 
explained with connective weights. 
Yet ACT strays from PDP as well. 
As with previous models, Anderson 
speaks of adding new propositions that 
form links to existing ones through an 
ever-growing array of extensions and 
nodes. It is somewhat analogous to 
building a structure on a table with 
wooden blocks and dowels. Each new 
proposition is represented by a wooden 
block, which must be properly connected 
with dowels to all other blocks it is 
associated with. The task of making all 
applicable connections with every new 
block soon becomes formidable and is 
restrained by the physical nature of the 
structure. It would be much simpler to 
have, say, a small box on that table with 
an electric grid. Each new proposition 
could be sent through the same grid as a 
pattern of impulses, and the associations 
and generalizations formed would be 
implicit. Such is the orderly structure that 
PDP imposes on the storage of 
knowledge. 
Another deviation from PDP in the 
ACT model regards its use of rule-based 
"production systems." PDP, while not 
ruling out the use of rules in cognition, 
prefers to search for explanations that do 
not necessitate them. A PDP model 
would never employ the use of production 
rules as a starting point in constructing a 
model, as this would tend to imply 
executive functioning. 
An interesting aspect of the 
relationship between episodic and 
semantic memory is brought up by Best 
(1992) in his discussion of the ACT 
theory. The discussion centers on the 
"type" node for cats (general, semantic 
memory) and the "token" nodes (specific, 
episodic memory) that branch from it. He 
states that in his own token nodes under 
"cat" there would be the representation 
"my cat recently scratched the sofa". He 
proceeds to theorize that with a few more 
observed examples of sofa-scratching by 
cats this episodic fact could be generalized 
and elevated to the level of semantic 
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knowledge in the type nodes (things that 
are true of all cats). 
PDP would take a different 
viewpoint on this, specifically in the need 
for "a few more examples of sofa-
scratching by cats". In PDP's view, one 
single episode of sofa-scratching would 
enter the weights relating to cats and 
would tend to generalize, at least to some 
degree. The result would be that a person 
in this situation would judge sofa-
scratching to be a trait of cats in general, 
albeit with a degree of probability low 
enough to spur the testing of this 
hypothesis. This is because, in effect, 
PDP's equivalent of "type" and "token" 
nodes lie within the same set of weights. 
In other words, each "cat" exemplar (and 
the weights that represent it) lies within a 
system of weights representing the overall 
concept of a cat. Under this supposition, 
if Best never again encountered any other 
cat scratching a sofa, the weights in the 
module representing "his cat" would be 
adjusted to reflect that sofa-scratching was 
unique to that one exemplar. More likely, 
he would encounter a number of 
subsequent examples pertaining to the 
scratching of a sofa by a cat, each of 
which would augment the weight 
representing that in the overall cat pattern. 
While PDP offers some enticing 
explanations of some aspects of cognitive 
functioning, it is obviously not universally 
accepted. As stated before, it is a 
considerable departure from conventional 
thinking, and therefore must answer to a 
wide range of questions that inevitably 
arise from the field. Presented in the 
following paragraphs is a sampling of 
some such objections and concerns. 
One of the objections deals with 
the hidden units. These aforementioned 
units reside in a layer between the input 
and output units and transform the signals 
between them in such a way as to greatly 
increase the processing power of a PDP 
model. While they may possibly be 
physiologically equivalent to interneurons 
in the mammalian nervous system, which 
are neither sensory nor motor (Hanson & 
Burr, 1990), some aspects of their 
incorporation into models have been 
questioned. Among these are the  
concerns regarding how to determine the 
number of hidden units that are to be 
employed in a given model, and whether 
this chosen number is based on any 
neurological data. Furthermore, there is 
some question about how the connective 
weights are assigned to the hidden units, 
with some suggesting the possibility of 
post-hoc fit with the data. In summary, 
one feeling is that "the number of hidden 
units, their connectivity with other units, 
[and] the weights...should be justified in 
terms of explicit principles" (Haberlandt, 
1990). 
PDP's response to this is based on 
the fact that it is still in its early stages and 
that, due to considerable self-imposed 
constraints on its structure, "there are no 
obvious principles that will allow the 
generic design of connectionist (PDP) 
models at this point" (Hanson & Burr, 
1990). Modeling systems that will 
function acceptably under the given 
constraints is the primary focus at this 
time; perhaps specific rules governing the 
many aspects of hidden units will emerge 
with continued research. 
Another objection concerns the 
issue often discussed in PDP of learning 
rules for behavior versus learning 
behavior through repetition that only 
appears to use rules. It has been argued 
that taking away rule formation leaves a 
substantial gap in human reasoning. In 
other words, it is our ability to form and 
utilize rules, rather than relying on the 
"percentages" predicted by repetition, that 
places humans above the lower animals on 
the reasoning ladder. Knowing the rule 
for obtaining B from A is vastly superior 
to just knowing that B results from A 
(Hendler, 1990). Levelt (1990) adds that 
a human, if told by the phone company to 
"add 2 to the end of every phone number 
starting today," could apply that rule 
easily without having to be retrained on 
-every phone number in his memory, as a 
PDP system would theoretically require. 
Levelt goes on to criticize the 
notion that learning in PDP networks is 
"natural," i.e., closely resembling human 
learning. He argues that models 
constructed in PDP are limited and 
specialized, thereby not allowing them to 
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be compared to human cognition from a 
psychological standpoint. One of his 
chief criticisms concerns the overriding of 
pre-existing knowledge when acquiring 
new knowledge. A child learning 
arithmetic, he maintains, can be taught 
addition first and multiplication later, 
without having to be retrained on the 
former. The only way to achieve both 
skills in a PDP model, he says, is to "train 
up" the two operations simultaneously, 
which does not correlate well with human 
behavior. 
PDP counters this line of thinking 
on two related fronts, both dealing with 
the limited abilities of constructed models 
at the current time. First, regarding rule 
usage, PDP maintains that a system 
"adopts representations to perform one 
task (as far as it knows) and if 'enough' 
constraints are present the network can 
apply the representation to new tasks" 
(Hanson & Burr, 1990). This is a question 
of "scaling," really; that is, the difficulties 
in mapping to new tasks are based on 
expanding the domain of the model, and 
not on any inherent weakness in the 
theory. Furthering this thought in a 
natural extension to the second point, "one 
must realize that when there is a 
dissociation between technology and 
theory, it is easy to make bad models" 
(Hanson & Burr, 1990). Simply stated, 
technological limitations need not damn 
the underlying theory; transforming a 
complex theory to hardware is a trial-and-
error endeavor at times, and its current 
lack of success should not be interpreted 
as a failure of the theory itself. 
PDP has been criticized by some, 
especially those in the field of linguistics, 
for conveying a system too close to 
empiricism, or "blank slate" views on 
mental development. Indeed, Hanson & 
Burr (1990) downplay Chomsky's 
Language Acquisition Device, stating that 
any tendencies. a human is likely to- be- 
born with would more probably deal with 
extreme generalities, such as the three-
dimensionality of the world, alternating 
cycles of light and darkness, etc., and not 
to "specific activities (such as chess 
playing, tennis, or speaking English, 
Shepard, 1987)." However, opponents of  
this argue in favor of something at least 
akin to LAD, employing as evidence the 
rapid rate with which we learn language 
as compared to other, less complex tasks. 
They argue that there must be some sort of 
naturally-constrained, "prewired" learning 
process to permit this (Jordan, 1990). 
Such a mechanism does not fit well within 
the framework and ideology of PDP. 
Others question the value of PDP's 
contribution to the field of psychology. 
While hidden units may have a 
neurological equivalent, the functioning 
they allow may be inconsistent with 
observed functioning in humans. 
Lamberts and d'Ydewalle (1990), for 
example, argue that if experimental 
evidence implies the use of three 
processing stages for a person to compute 
a certain mapping, and if a PDP model 
with hidden units is constructed to do it in 
only two stages, then that model is simply 
incorrect psychologically. Lamberts and 
d'Ydewalle further contend that simply 
because a model has "neural plausibility" 
does not necessarily make it 
psychologically relevant. That is, that a 
model can accurately explain what the 
brain could be doing within the constraints 
of physiological knowledge cannot be 
taken without question to mean that this is 
what it actually is doing (an application of 
the fact that a theory's successful 
explanation of something does not 
guarantee the correctness of that theory). 
Again, PDP is forced to stand 
behind its early stage of development in 
answer to this, implying that it is perhaps 
not yet "time to map these models into 
specific theories of cognition" (Hanson & 
Burr, 1990). Groundwork is being laid 
and its success is encouraging, but PDP 
admits that it is not yet a perfect match to 
biology. However, given the restrictions 
it places on itself in regard to neural 
architecture, it seems the future 
application of the beliefs to specific 
cognitive theories is promising. 
Some in the field of psychology 
argue that all representations in a PDP 
network are symbolic, basically being the 
transformation of external stimuli to 
excitatory or inhibitory impulses between 
units, and that this type of representation 
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is insufficient for interacting with the 
world. Icons, they say, are necessary to 
preserve the internal structure of the 
stimuli that form them, to preserve 
"similarity relations," and to allow for 
generalization. Symbolic representations 
are only arbitrarily related to the external 
stimuli that form them, and can therefore 
"neither preserve similarity relations nor 
support generalization" (Phillips, 
Hancock, and Smith, 1990). 
This is countered somewhat by the 
working example of the model discussed 
earlier (that dealt with the recognition of 
"dogs"), wherein (what is here referred to 
as) a symbolic system was indeed 
successful in "preserving similarity 
relations," extracting a prototype, etc. 
Churchland (1989) states that the brain is 
"a purely physical system... short of 
appealing to magic, or simply refusing to 
confront the problem at all, we must 
assume that some configuration of purely 
physical elements is capable of grasping 
and manipulating features, and by means 
of purely physical principles." Neurons 
compose the brain and are relatively 
simple entities, their duties apparently 
being merely the sending and receiving of 
impulses. 
Other objections focus on the 
complexity of PDP, and the necessity of 
searching for an irreducible element. 
Suppes (1990) contends that the barriers 
to understanding all the intricate details of 
a highly complex process (such as human 
cognition) 	 are 	 functionally 
insurmountable, and the issue is better 
studied at a higher, more general level. 
The argument has also arisen regarding 
our lack of knowledge about what is 
happening within the model itself. Pavel 
(1990) warns that "we must be wary of 
modeling one complex system that we do 
not understand (e.g., Homo sapiens) by 
another (e.g., [PDP] networks)." 
There are other objections -that 
could be discussed, among them the 
assertion that PDP is passive and therefore 
not cognitive, that there is not enough 
known about neurology to build models 
that attempt to simulate the brain, etc., but 
detailing all of them goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. It should be noted,  
though, that proponents of PDP have 
plausible responses to a large number of 
these objections, some of which have been 
touched on in other sections of this paper. 
Until PDP is further developed, there will 
be remain some controversial points, 
particularly on the philosophical front. 
PDP is enduring well, given the 
boldness of its assertions. Like a new 
theory in any discipline that is a 
considerable departure from the currently 
accepted one, it has to constantly defend 
itself; yet it has not seemed thus far to 
have suffered quite so much of a 
vehement and universal denial as other 
frontier theories have. Perhaps this 
reflects a new cautiousness in the 
scientists of today in their propensity for 
rejecting radical new ideas (some of 
whom in psychology may still be 
reminded of the complete paradigm shift 
away from behaviorism), or perhaps it is a 
result of its "naturalness." By this I mean 
that there probably exist a significant 
number of people in the field of cognition 
that have felt some degree of discomfort 
in accepting and referring to cognition as 
an abstract process. The brain is 
essentially the last organ to be understood 
physically, and any progress on that front 
tends to lend credibility to the field and 
creates a firm foundation on which to 
build, not one that may be swept away by 
the next theory that arises. In other words, 
many people are ripe for the study of 
cognition from a physiologically-
supportable standpoint, as opposed to a 
metaphorical one. 
Furthermore, PDP may well allow 
some previous theories back into at least 
partial acceptability. Much of how it 
accounts for various cognitive operations 
dances dangerously close to behaviorism 
(which it has, in fact, been accused of), 
and its ideas about "settling" or "relaxing" 
to solutions regarding schemata would 
probably induce a smile from the 
ostracized gestalt theorist. Perhaps PDP 
has the ability to marry the past, present 
and future into one collective viewpoint, 
extracting the accepted strengths of past 
theories and incorporating them into a 
new weave. 
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